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Abstract 
The market capitalization of international bond markets is much larger than that of international equity markets. However, 
compared to the large body of literature on international equity market linkages, there are few empirical studies of bond systemic 
risk or international bond market co-movements. However, the extent of international bond market linkages does merit 
investigation, as it may have important implications for the cost of financing fiscal deficit, monetary policymaking independence, 
modelling and forecasting long-term interest rates, and bond portfolio diversification. In this paper, we investigate the relative 
influence of systemic and idiosyncratic risk factors on yield spreads over 10-year German government securities during the seven 
years after the beggining of Monetary Integration. We estimate both panel regressions for the two group of EU-15 countries 
(EMU and non-EMU) and specific-country regressions for the nine and three countries in the two groups. All estimations 
include both domestic (differences in market liquidity and credit risk) and international risk factors. The results present clear 
evidence that it is idiosyncratic rather than systemic risk factors that mostly drive the evolution of 10-year yield spread differentials 
over Germany in all EMU countries during the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. Conversely, in the case of 
non-EMU countries, adjusted yield spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange factor) are influenced more by systemic risk 
factors. The fact that these countries do not share a common Monetary Policy might explain these results, which may show that 
government bonds from EMU countries have a better safe-haven status compared to non-EMU countries. 
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1. Introduction. 
The market capitalization of international bond markets is larger than that of international equity 
markets. However, compared to the large body of literature on international equity market linkages 
(see Bessler and Yang, 2003), there are few empirical studies of bond systemic risk or international 
bond market linkages (Smith, 2002 and Barr and Priestley, 2004). However, the extent of 
international bond market linkages does merit investigation, as it may have important implications 
for the cost of financing fiscal deficit, monetary policymaking independence, modeling and 
forecasting long-term interest rates, and bond portfolio diversification.  
Conversely, more has been written on emerging countries, where a very important question in the 
study of spread co-movements is the analysis of the relative influence of fundamental variables on 
that behavior (see Cifarelli and Paladino, 2006). Economies are related through trade and financial 
flows, and shifts in the economic fundamentals of one country may affect its neighbours. However, 
in periods of growing uncertainty, changes in market sentiment may go beyond fundamentals and 
generate “contagion phenomena”1. Calvo and Reinhart (1996), Masson (1999) and, more recently, 
Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) draw a distinction between fundamentals-based contagion, which 
arises when the “infected country” is connected to others via trade and/or financial links, and pure 
contagion, which is due to a shift in market sentiment without (or beyond) links in economic 
fundamentals. Therefore, even though there is far more literature on emerging than on developed 
economies, in both cases, it is well established that bond markets in different countries tend to 
move together, i.e. bond prices and returns are positively correlated across countries. Some of the 
early attempts to investigate this issue are Clare et al. (1995) who provided insight into the 
significance of international bond market linkages for bond portfolio diversification, and Ilmanen 
(1995), whose evidence suggested that excess returns  of long international bonds were highly 
correlated implying, in turn, international bond market integration. More recently, Hunter and 
Simon (2005), using a bivariate conditional correlation GARCH model, examine the lead-lag and 
                                                 
1 In the context of developed countries, Favero and Giavazzi (2002) study the presence of non-linearities in the propagation of financial 
shocks (devaluation expectations) among the countries that were member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS.   
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contemporaneous relationships between 10-year US government bond returns and 10-year UK, 
German, and Japanese government bond returns. They find that the mean and volatility of the US 
bond market lead the mean and volatility of both German and Japanese bond markets, whilst there 
is no significant lead-lag relation between the US and UK bond markets. Volatility spillover from 
world bond markets into individual bond markets has also focused the attention of the literature. In 
particular, Christiansen (2007) finds strong statistical evidence of volatility spillover from the US 
and aggregate European bond markets into individual European bond markets. For EMU 
countries, the US volatility spillover effects are rather weak (in economic terms) whereas the 
European volatility-spillover effects are strong. Earlier studies used co-integration analysis to 
document the co-movement of international bonds markets (see De Gennaro et al.(1994), Clare at 
al. (1995), Barassi et al. (2001), Smith (2002) or Driessen et al. (2003)). These co-integration analyses 
do not, however, examine co-movement in the underlying factors determining bond yields. Ilmanen 
(1995) suggests a number of factors determining international bond returns, and finds that a small 
set of global (world) factors accounts for the predictable variation in bond returns and their cross-
country correlation. In particular, wealth-dependent risk-aversion of bond investors appears to be 
an important source of international co-movement. Barr and Priestley (2004) also find that bond 
returns in different countries are predictable over time; based on an international CAPM they find 
that 70 per cent of the variation in expected returns is due to world risk factors while the remaining 
30 per cent is due to local country-specific risk factors. They interpret this result as indicating that 
national bond markets are only partially integrated into world markets.  
In this context, this study contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, the main goal of this 
paper is to assess the relative importance of systemic/world risk factors or idiosyncratic/local risk 
factors in explaining yield spreads in EU-15 countries (both EMU and non-EMU participating) 
after the introduction of the common currency. In our opinion, the recent literature overestimates 
the impact of systemic risk on the behaviour of yield differentials in EMU countries (see Favero, 
Pagano and Von Thadden (2007); Geyer, Kossmeier and Pischer (2004) or Pagano and Von 
Thadden (2004), among others). Certainly, yield evolution depends on both world and local risk 
factors, i.e. systemic and idiosyncratic risk. However, when differentials between yields are taken, 
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the impact of world or common risk factors should mostly cancel out. Second, our empirical 
estimation uses a broader dataset than in previous studies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first empirical study that implements an analysis of the effects of Monetary Union on the relative 
importance of systemic and idiosyncratic risk in EU-15 governments’ bonds yield spreads with daily 
data for such a long period of time (data set covers seven years since the beginning of EMU, from 
1999 to 2005). Third, in this paper, the analysis goes beyond EMU countries and studies the 
influence of Monetary Union in the relative importance of the different sources of risk. Therefore, 
our final goal is to assess the relative importance of the two kinds of risk factors in yield 
differentials in two groups of EU-15 countries (EMU and non-EMU participating) during the first 
seven years of Monetary Integration. So, in order to be able to compare the results, we implement a 
similar methodology (both a panel and a country-specific analysis) as in our previous papers 
(Gómez-Puig, 2006, 2008a and 2008b), where dataset covered the period 1999-2001.The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature on this topic. Section 3 
explains the methodology, whilst data and explanatory variables are described in Section 4. The 
model is explained in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 reports the results and section 7 draws the main 
conclusions. 
2. Related Literature. 
Some recent literature (using other approaches) has assessed the relative importance of systemic 
and idiosyncratic risk in EMU sovereign yield spreads (see Geyer, Kossmeier and Pischler (2004), 
Pagano and von Thadden (2004) or Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2007)). Nevertheless, our 
results differ in suggesting that it is idiosyncratic factors that mostly drive yield differentials, and 
that systemic risk plays only a marginal role. In this sense, Geyer et al. estimate a multi-issuer state-
space version of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985) model of the evolution of bond-yield spreads (over 
Germany) for four EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, Italy and Spain). Their main findings are (i) 
one single (“global”) factor explains a large part of the movement of all four processes, (ii) 
idiosyncratic country factors have almost no explanatory power, and (iii) the variation in the single 
global factor can to a limited extent be explained by EMU corporate-bond risk, but by nothing else. 
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The most striking finding in Geyer et al. (2004) is the virtual absence of country-specific yield-
spread risk. On the other hand, despite the considerable differences in the methodology and data 
used, Geyer et al. and Pagano and von Thadden (2004) analysis agree that yield differentials under 
EMU are driven mainly by a common risk (default) factor and suggest that liquidity differences 
have at best a minor role in the time-series behavior of yield spreads. Our results differ clearly in 
suggesting that it is idiosyncratic factors that mostly drive yield differentials. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that Geyer et al.’s measurement of liquidity variables is more indirect than ours, 
as they do not use data on bid-ask spreads; furthermore, and on the other hand, Pagano and von 
Thadden work with data taken from the Euro MTS trading platform which includes only the 
transactions made through this platform and not in the whole market, as we do in our paper. 
However, Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2007) recognize that aggregate (global) risk and 
liquidity may interact with each other in non-trivial manners, which allows us to accept that their 
results are consistent with the ones presented in this paper. In particular, these authors propose a 
simple asset-pricing model with exogenous transactions and endogenous liquidity demand, where a 
bond’s liquidity premium depends both on its transaction cost and on investment opportunities. 
Their model predicts that yield differentials should increase in both liquidity and aggregate risk, 
with an interaction term of the opposite sign. The empirical evidence they find support their 
predictions. Therefore, according to them a direct estimation of the impact of liquidity on prices, 
i.e. an estimation that ignores the indirect effect caused by the interaction with world-wide risk, is 
likely to underestimate its impact, which can be amplified or dampened by aggregate risk. The sign 
of this interaction term depends on the covariation between the cost of illiquidity and aggregate 
risk2  Moreover, their “liquidity risk view” highlights that liquidity is priced not only because it 
creates trading costs but also because it is itself a source of risk since it changes unpredictably over 
                                                 
2 Their model is based on the idea that the demand for liquidity responds both to the magnitude of trading costs and to the availability of 
outside investment opportunities. First, investors are less inclined to trade securities with larger trading costs. Second, they are less likely to 
liquidate securities when outside investment opportunities are less attractive, a situation which is assumed to coincide with increased 
aggregate risk. As a result, when risk is expected to increase, investors’ demand for liquidity abates, and the premium they place on more 
liquid securities declines. Therefore, although in general investors value liquidity, they value it less when risk increases. Their estimates 
support their intuition. 
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time. Since investors care about returns net of trading costs, the variability of trading costs affects 
the risk of a security. So, current liquidity is a predictor of future liquidity risk, and is therefore 
priced. This approach is then consistent with the self-fulfilling nature of liquidity that, following 
Economides and Siow (1988), Gómez-Puig (2006, 2008a, and 2008b) put forward. The central 
intuition is that as long as “ex-ante” traders prefer bigger and liquid markets (because they will 
present lower price volatility, bigger scale economies and higher probability of a favorable match) 
to small and illiquid markets, liquidity will be “self-reinforcing”. That is, since traders prefer to 
participate in liquid markets, more traders will participate in them, and more liquid they will be. In 
other words, liquidity will be self-fulfilling because deals create positive externalities by increasing 
the depth of the secondary market, and thus the price of a future resale. Therefore, if liquidity is 
self-fulfilling, the proxies of market liquidity might present a non-linear relationship, i.e. a 
liquid/illiquid market might lead to an increasingly lower/higher liquidity premium.  This non-linear 
behaviour will also be analysed in this paper. In order to compare the results with those obtained in 
Gómez-Puig (2008a and 2008b), proxies for market liquidity present a specific nonlinear structure: 
“a quadratic form”. In our opinion, this is a right way to capture self-fulfilling effects in liquidity, 
even though it is not the only one.  For example, in the econometric model of contagion advanced 
in Pesaran and Pick (2007), self-fulfilling effects are generated by multiple equilibria (along the same 
lines as in Masson (1999)), and are created by the inclusion of endogenous dummy variables. 
3. Methodology.  
An important issue for assets that are traded internationally is the extent to which the time-varying 
compensation that investors require for accepting a risky payoff is the extent to which this 
compensation is driven by world, rather than domestic, factors, i.e. the extent to which the 
domestic market is integrated into world markets. Several papers have investigated this issue but, as 
we noted above, most of them focus on equity markets. In this paper we ask what can be learned 
from European bond markets after Monetary Integration and, in particular, we will assess the 
relative importance of systemic or idiosyncratic risk factors in explaining European Union-15 
countries’ yield spreads after the introduction of the Euro.  
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One way to study this is to assume that markets are fully integrated, and to test the restrictions 
generated by Asset Pricing Models (APMs): a rejection is interpreted as a rejection of the joint 
hypothesis of full integration and the APM (Dumas and Solnik, 1995). However, this integration 
assumption reflects a fundamental difficulty in international asset pricing, since current APMs can 
accommodate only the two extremes of integration or segmentation, and both of these will be 
rejected if markets are only partially integrated. Some combination of the polar models is required 
in order to deal with partially integrated markets. The work by Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997) and 
Barr and Priestley (2004) is in this vein and allows the level of integration to change over time by 
combining the polar models. In this paper, we use a model that draws on Barr and Priestley (2004) 
and Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2007) in order to investigate the level of integration in the 
European Union bond markets.  
Therefore: 
We assume that yields (yi,t) for country i are related to world and local information variables as 
follows (see Barr and Priestley):  
yi,t=ai  + bWi ZWi,t bLi ZLi,t +bWLi [ZWi,t . ZLi,t] +  i,t                                                                         (1)         
Where ZWi,t represents the world variables, ZLi,t represents local variables for country i, ZWi,t . ZLi,t 
represents the interaction between them, and i,t is an error term. Following Favero, Pagano and von 
Thadden (2007)3 we allow yields to be explained in terms of exogenous risk premiums (specifically, 
banking risk premiums in the United States) which will appear in the regression both linearly and 
interacting with the domestic risk variables. The interaction term needs to be included to avoid the 
omitted variables problem. Equation (1) is consistent with a range of asset pricing models, and with 
any level of integration. If a market is fully integrated the local variables should be absent from it.  
Similarly, if it is completely segmented, the world variables will be absent. 
                                                 
3 These authors point out that a look at the time-series behaviour of Euro-area yield differentials suggests that yield differentials tend to 
fluctuate together, much more than measures of liquidity or default risk do. This suggests that domestic factors alone cannot be the full 
answer, and that there must be other factors driving yield differentials. Such factors are likely to be related to international investment 
opportunities or global risk perceptions.  
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However, it should be easy to understand that when we take differences between yields, i.e. we 
calculate yield spreads (Si,t) for country i over Germany, the effect of world risk variables should 
mostly disappear or cancel out. So, yield spreads will mostly depend on local or domestic risk 
factors. However, due to the recent debate in the literature, we will assess the impact of both kinds 
of variables on yield spreads by assuming that they are related to world and local information 
variables and to the interaction between them, as follows: 
Si,t = ai  + bWi ZWi,t + bLi ZLi,t + bWLi [ZWi,t . ZLi,t] +  i,t                                                                 (2)                                            
The yield patterns are reflected in their correlation across countries. All EU-15 (EMU and non-
EMU participating) country yields are fairly highly correlated with the U.S. 10-year yields. Table 1 
shows that the cross-sectional average correlation is 0.75, providing weak evidence of integration. 
Therefore, the average contribution of world factors to domestic returns across the thirteen 
countries we study (Luxembourg and Greece are excluded from our sample) is 75%. This level 
seems surprisingly low in view of the absence of impediments to cross-country investment. 
Nevertheless, the figures in this table show a very high and similar correlation across EU-15 
countries’ yields (the average correlation with Germany 10-year yields is 0.98 and 0.99 if we 
consider only EMU-countries), except in the case of the United Kingdom which presents an 
average level of correlation of 0.84 with German yields and one of 0.82 with the rest of EU-15 
countries in our sample. This evidence supports the idea (see Gómez-Puig 2008b) that outside the 
Euro-area, the Currency Union has enhanced the “singularity” of the debt markets because their 
securities are still denominated in their own currency. In particular, the British market, which before 
EMU was not only one of the most important European debt markets, but was also the European 
market with the highest share of foreign assets as a function of total financial wealth (see Adjaouté 
et al., 2001 or Tesar and Werner, 1995), is surely the one that has capitalized most on this new 
advantage and has attracted a significant volume of funds. 
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Table 2 shows the correlation between spreads (adjusted spreads or spreads corrected from the 
exchange rate factor in the case of non-EMU countries4) and the world risk variable used to capture 
international risk (the  differential between 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on 
10-year Moody’s Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds, USSPREADit). This table clearly shows that 
the correlation with global risk factors can mostly be ignored when differentials are taken in EMU 
countries (the average value is -0.04, and Portugal is the only country that presents a slight positive 
average value of 0.107). In the case of non-EMU countries we find very different results. The 
average correlation between the variable adjusted spread (the yield spread corrected from the 
foreign exchange factor) and the global risk factor is 0.4. The country with the lowest coefficient is 
Denmark, whilst the country with the highest one is the United Kingdom (0.56) Finally, Table 3 
presents the evolution of yield spreads or adjusted yield spreads (in the case of non-EMU 
countries) during three sub-periods into which the whole sample has been broken down: 1999-
2000, 2001-2002, and 2003-2005. It can be observed that, within the EMU, yield differentials 
experience a high decrease during the last three years of the period. During the third sub-period, 
2003-2005, except in the case of Italy, the average values are less than half the value they present 
for the whole period. In the case of non-EMU countries, except in the case of Denmark which only 
presents a negative value during the third period (the fact that the exchange rate regime, in this 
country, links the evolution of its currency to the Euro explains why Denmark’s yield spreads 
present a behavior which is closer to EMU-countries than to non-EMU countries), the other two 
countries (Sweden and the United Kingdom) display negative adjusted spread values in the four 
periods. Nevertheless, this negative differential is lower at the end of the sample than during the 
first years following the introduction of the Euro. Therefore, market capitalization of the advantage 
presented by these markets over Euro-area debt markets in terms of the benefits derived from 
portfolio diversification and risk reduction was higher in the first years after the beginning of 
Monetary Union. On the other hand, it can also be observed that volatility (measured by the 
                                                 
4 As we will explain later in this paper, following Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997), we will correct non-EMU spreads by estimating the 
foreign exchange factor as the differential between the 10 year swap rate in the currency of denomination of the bond and the 10 year 
swap rate in Deutsche marks. 
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standard deviation) has sharply decreased in the last period of the sample for most of the European 
countries (the only exceptions are Finland, the Netherlands and Ireland) These observations 
suggest that three separate estimations for each one of the sub-periods will present wider 
information than a single estimation for the complete sample. So, we will estimate the model for 
the four samples (the whole period and the three sub-periods) in order to compare the results.  
Figures 1 and 2 display the evolution of 10-year yields and 10-year yield spreads over Germany, 
respectively, for EMU countries. These figures show, on the one hand, the high co-movement 
presented by 10-year yields during the first seven years of Currency Union (figure 1) and, on the 
other, the lower co-movement and higher volatility presented by yield spreads throughout the 
sample (figure 2). The evolution of the same variables in the case of the three non-Euro countries 
included in our sample is displayed in figures 3 and 4. In particular, these figures show that the 
country with the highest spread over Germany is the United Kingdom, while the country whose 
government’s yields follow those of Germany most closely is Denmark. Finally, figure 5 presents 
the evolution of 10-year swap spreads over Germany of the three countries in our sample that do 
not participate in the Euro (since, as it will be explained, we will use the 10-year swap differential 
over Germany as an approximation of currency risk), whilst figure 6 displays the evolution of the 
dependent variable we will use in the case of these countries: the spread corrected from the 
exchange rate risk factor which we will call “adjusted spread” (note that this variable presents a 
negative value in the case of Sweden and the United Kingdom throughout the sample).  
As discussed by Favero et al. (1997) a direct measure of the component of yield differentials not 
related to exchange rate factors can be obtained by comparing the yields of assets issued by two 
different states in two different currencies (say, one in Spanish pesetas, the other in D-marks) and 
the yield spreads in the same currencies and with the same life to maturity issued by the same (non-
government) subject, or by two otherwise comparable issuers (in the second case, apart from the 
exchange rate risk, other factors influencing yield spreads can then be ignored when differences are 
taken). Candidates for this measure are: (1) long-term bonds issued by the same supra-national 
organization (such as the World Bank or the European Investment Bank), (2) long-term bonds 
issued by the private sector, and (3) the fixed interest rates on swap contracts. However, on balance, 
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the drawbacks of the interest differential on supranational issues or corporate issues seem to be 
greater. So though not a perfect measure, the spread on fixed interest rate swap contracts can be 
used as an indicator of the exchange rate determinant of the yield spread on government bonds, as 
it seems to be the best indicator of this yield spread component5.  
So we denominate: 
Ii,10       =  10-year  Yield on sovereign bonds of country i 
IRSi,10= 10-year Interest Rate Swap rate of currency i  
Where, considering that differences in tax-regimes were reduced to insignificant levels during the 
course of the 1990s: 
Ii,10=f(DRi,10,Li,10, ERi.,10)                                                                                                                  (3) 
DRi,10 = Default risk of country i 10-year sovereign bonds.  
Li,10    = Liquidity of country i 10-year sovereign bonds. 
ERi., 10  = Exchange rate risk of currency i over a 10-year horizon. 
Therefore the 10-year yield differential of country i over Germany will be: 
YIELDSPREADit=[Ii,10-IGE,10]t=f([DRi,10-DRGE,10]t,[Li,10-LGE,10]t,[ERi,10-ERGE,10]t)                         (4) 
Then, if we approximate:  
[IRSi,10-IRSGE,10]t=[ERi,10-ERGE,10]t                                                                                                  (5) 
We can build up the variable “ADJUSTED SPREADit”, as the difference between the total yield 
differential and the swap rate differential, 
ADJUSTED SPREADit     = ASPREADit  =  
                                       = [Ii,10 - IGE,10]t  – [IRSi,10 - IRSGE,10]t = 
                              =f([DRi,10-DRGE,10]t,[Li,10-LGE,10]t,[ERi,10-ERGE,10]t)-[ERi,10-ERGE,10]t             (6) 
it can be inferred that the variable ASPREADit, which will be used as the dependent variable in the 
case of non-EMU countries, will mainly account for credit risk and market liquidity differences6 of 
country i‘s sovereign securities over Germany. So this variable could be considered an appropriate 
                                                 
5 See Gómez-Puig (2008a) for a much more detailed explanation. 
6 We are not considering the effect of international risk factors in this breakdown 
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indicator of yield differential components not related to exchange rate factors. Table 4 presents the 
difference of 10-year spreads over Germany, in the three countries mentioned, when they are 
corrected from the exchange rate factor. As figure 6 shows, in the case of Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, their average is negative during the seven-year period.   
4. Data and explanatory variables.  
The sample includes all EU-15 countries, with the exception of Luxembourg and Greece. So, in 
this paper, we will expand on the analysis presented in Gómez-Puig (2008a and 2008b), where we 
studied the immediate effect of the introduction of a common currency on the risk factors that 
drive the evolution of yield spreads in both groups of countries. We will then use daily data 
spanning the period January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2005 which will enable us to analyse yield 
spreads behaviour of all EU-15 countries with the perspective given by this long period of time 
(seven years) since the beginning of Monetary Union.  
The dependent variable used in our estimations is the spread (or adjusted spread) of 10-year 
government yield over Germany. Therefore, a crucial issue in this paper (and one that is vital for 
policymaking) is the identification of the two main local or domestic sources of risk that have made 
up yield spreads in European countries since the start of Monetary Integration. So, we attempt to 
break down the liquidity premium and credit-risk components by modeling their behavior to a 
number of factors that can potentially affect only one of them. With this goal in mind, the relative 
debt-to-GDP ratio will be used as a proxy to measure differences in credit risk7. This variable has 
been widely used in the literature by other authors (Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) among 
them8) and, compared with other measures such as the rating differential, presents the advantage 
that it cannot be considered an ex-post measure of fiscal sustainability. Considering that a liquid 
market can be defined as one in which participants can rapidly execute a large volume of 
                                                 
7 Table 5 presents the outstanding amounts of government’s securities at the end of each year of the sample. If we consider the EU-15 as a 
whole, the biggest markets, in descending order: the Italian, the German, the French, the British and the Spanish. 
8 In particular, these authors find support for the market discipline hypothesis in the U.S. bond markets. This hypothesis assumes that yields 
rise smoothly at an increasing rate with the level of borrowing. However, if these incentives prove ineffective, credit markets will eventually 
respond by denying irresponsible borrowers further access to credit. Nevertheless, the model presented in this paper and Bayoumi et al. 
model do not control for the same variables and cannot be compared. 
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transactions with a small impact on prices, in this paper, two different proxy variables will be used 
to measure this effect: (i) the bid/ask spread and (ii) the on-the run/off-the run spread. The 
bid/ask spread is one of the best measures of liquidity because it reflects the cost incurred by a 
typical investor in unwinding an asset position and measures one of the most important dimensions 
of liquidity: tightness, i.e. how far transaction prices differ from mid-market prices. Additionally, the 
liquidity of an asset is generally understood as the ease of its conversion into money. Therefore, 
because the conversion of an asset into money involves certain costs (search costs, delays, broker’s 
commissions, etc…); the higher these costs, the lower the degree of liquidity. Note that as market 
dealers reduce their liquidity risk, the bid/ask spread should narrow with trading activity. 
Nevertheless, we will also include in our model a secondary measure of liquidity: the yield spread 
between more and less liquid securities, which is also a liquidity measure used in the Treasury 
market (see Fleming, 2003). Since liquidity has value, more liquid securities tend to have higher 
prices (lower yields) than less liquid securities. The yield spread is often calculated as the difference 
between the yield of an off-the-run (older securities of a given maturity) and that of an on-the-run 
(benchmark) security with similar cash-flow characteristics. Positive spreads indicate that on-the-
run securities are trading at a yield discount (or price premium) to off-the-run securities. Lastly, as 
noted above, a third point that will be assessed in this paper is the influence of international risk 
factors on yield spreads. Hence, the analysis will also build on the findings of recent works that 
suggest that yield spreads on government securities are sensitive to international risk factors, and 
compare the relative importance of these two sources (domestic and international) of risk factors 
on yield spreads.   
Yields and swap rates were obtained from Datastream and correspond to the “on the run” 
(benchmark) 10-year issue for each market at every moment of time. They are quoted rates at market 
close. Datastream creates continuous yield series by taking the yield from the current benchmark in 
each market and using it to update a separate time series. As a benchmark changes, data are taken 
from a new stock on the first day of the month. Table 6 presents the starting benchmark dates used 
by Datastream as well as the characteristics of the different benchmarks that compose the yield series 
for the different countries of our sample. With regard to the bid/ask spreads series, daily time-series 
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were created by calculating the spread between the bid and ask quotations provided by Bloomberg for 
the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue for each market at every moment in time, using the same 
benchmarks and starting dates that Datastream uses to create the 10-year yield series. For all the 
different issues Bloomberg provides daily quoted prices calculated as the average bid and ask 
quotations at the close. A similar methodology is used to build the on-the-run/off-the-run spread 
daily time-series. These series were created by calculating the differences between the “on the run” 
(benchmark) 10-year issue and the “off the run” (immediately older security) 10-year issue yields 
provided by Bloomberg for each market at every moment of time, also using the same benchmarks 
and starting dates that Datastream uses to create the 10-year yield and swap rates series (see table 6). 
The overall outstanding amounts of public debt data have been drawn from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS; see table 5) and the GDP from Eurostat. However, as these series are 
only provided every three months, for the construction of the relative debt-to-GDP ratio daily time-
series, the rest of the data have been extrapolated assuming a daily constant rate of increase of those 
volumes, which in fact present very slight differences within countries over the studied period. For 
this reason, it can be assumed that the extrapolation will not produce important biases in the data and 
can be applied in this case. And finally, the spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps 
and the yield on 10-year Moody’s Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds (USSPREADit), has been 
calculated from daily data obtained from Datastream. All the variables included in the estimation that 
capture domestic risk factors are relative to the German ones. Thus, BIDASKDIFit is the difference 
between the bid/ask spread in country i and the bid/ask spread in Germany, ONOFFDIFit is the 
difference between the on the run /off the run spread in country i and that in Germany and 
LNDEBTGDPit is the (log) deviation of country i debt-to-GDP ratio from Germany’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio.  
5. Model.  
In the specification, in addition to the local and world risk variables mentioned (LNDEBTGDPit, 
BIDASKDIFit, ONOFFDIFit, and USSPREADit), country and monthly dummy variables will be 
introduced. Further, in order to assess whether there exists a varying relationship between liquidity 
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variables and the yield SPREADSit or ASPREADSit (if liquidity is self-fulfilling, the proxies of 
market liquidity might present a non-linear relationship, i.e. a liquid/illiquid market might lead to an 
increasingly lower/higher liquidity premium) a quadratic specification for the variables 
BIDASKDIFit, and ONOFFDIFit  is formulated.  
So, with the following defined previously: 
BIDASKDIF2it = (BIDASKDIF)2it 
ONOFFDIF2it =   (ONOFFDIF)2it 
The local risk variables (ZLi,t) will be: 
ZLi,t=(LNDEBTGDPit,BIDASKDIFit,BIDASKDIF2it,ONOFFDIFit,ONOFFDIF2it)                     (7) 
While the world risk variables (ZWi,t) will be: 
ZWi,t =USSPREADit                                                                                                                          (8) 
We first estimate model I, which is a panel model, in order to  analyse whether there exist 
important differences in the effect of the different sources of risk on yield differentials in the two 
group of countries (euro and non-euro participating),  then we allow for slope heterogeneity by 
estimating in model II a specific regression for each of the twelve countries in the sample.  
Then, model I is a static panel regression9 with both domestic and international risk variables that 
will be estimated for both group of countries (EMU and non-EMU participating) 
yit = i + Xit +δMONTHLYDUMMIESt  + λCOUNTRYDUMMIESi + it                                               
Where, with the world (ZWi,t) and local risk variables (ZLi,t) previously defined, 
The vector of independent variables will be: 
Xit=(ZWi,t , ZLi,t, [ZWi,t . ZLi,t])                                                                                                           (9) 
In the above panel regressions, with very few exceptions, country dummies turn out to be significant 
at the 5 per cent confidence level, meaning that specific factors in each different country are relevant 
and suggesting that a separate estimation for each of them will provide fuller information. We will do 
                                                 
9 In Gómez-Puig (2008a), taking into account that some aspects of both domestic and international risk do not change over the considered 
period, with the objective to identify the relative importance of risk variables in explaining fluctuations, rather than levels of yield differentials, 
a lag of the dependent variable was introduced in the model. However, the results from both specifications (static and dynamic) only 
presented slight differences. This is the reason why we only estimate a static model in this paper. 
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this in the second set of regressions (model II) where, using the same independent variables as in the 
panel regressions, a static regression will be implemented separately for each of the twelve countries in  
the sample. Therefore, the following empirical model on daily data will be implemented separately for 
each individual country10:  
yit=i+Xit+ δMONTHLYDUMMIESt +it                                                                                (10) 
Hence, twelve regressions will be calculated, where the vector of independent variables will be: 
Xit= (ZWi,t , ZLi,t, [ZWi,t . ZLi,t])                                
Model I and II will be estimated for the whole period (1999-2005), and the three sub-periods into 
which we have broken it down and, for both groups of countries. Our intention is to analyse whether 
the impact of the different variables changes throughout the two samples and between them. The first 
sub-period spans 1999 to 2000, the second 2001 to 2002 and the third 2003 to 2005.  
6. Results 
The estimation methods used in all specifications, Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS)11 in 
the panel estimation and a regression with Newey-West standard errors in the estimations for each 
Euro-country, are robust to the possible existence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the 
error terms. Tables 7 and 8 present the results for EMU-countries. The panel regressions (table 7) 
clearly show that domestic risk factors are much more significant than common or international 
risk factors in explaining yield spread behaviour in EMU countries during the first seven years of 
Monetary Union. Actually, the world risk variable is only positively significant at the 10% 
confidence level in the estimation corresponding to the whole period. With regard to the domestic 
risk factors, the results show the following conclusions. Both credit risk (when it is interacted with 
                                                 
10 As it has been explained, in order to analyse whether it exist important differences in the effect of the different sources of risk in yield 
differentials in the two group of countries (euro and non-euro participating). In specification I, we implicitly impose the slope homogeneity 
assumption. This is the reason why we also include specification II where we allow a different slope for each country.  
11 FGLS is only used in order to deal with the problem of possible existence of heterocedasticity or autocorrelation of the error term. This 
method of estimation allows to avoid this problem and to obtain robust results even when we impose the assumption of fixed effects in a 
panel model as it is imposed in our model.  
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the international risk variable12) and liquidity risk (this one captured by the bid-ask spread) are the 
variables with higher impact on yield spreads. Both variables are positively significant at the 5% 
confidence level not only in the whole sample, but also in the three sub-periods. The self-fulfilling 
nature of liquidity is corroborated by the results. If we consider the coefficients of the quadratic 
liquidity variables interacted with the world risk variable, we can conclude that both the bid-ask 
spread and the on-the-run/off-the-run spread present a positive non-linear behavior (except in the 
period 1999-2000). Consequently, liquidity will be “self-reinforcing”: since traders prefer to 
participate in liquid markets, more will participate in them, and the more liquid they will be. Finally, 
country dummy variables turn out to be always significant, with very few exceptions (France and 
the Netherlands in the estimation that includes the entire period, and Belgium in the first and 
second sub-periods). These results mean that specific factors in each different country are relevant 
and suggest that a separate estimation for each of them will provide wider information. This is why 
we estimate nine individual regressions for each country, using the same periods and the same 
explanatory variables as in the panel regressions. From these sets of estimations (tables 8) the 
following conclusions are worth noting. In the majority of the countries, the world risk factor only 
plays a marginal role. Actually, only in the case of Italy and Portugal (as we noted in table 2, 
Portugal is the only country that presented a positive correlation between its 10-year yield spread 
over Germany and the US banking risk factor), does the world risk factor present a positive 
coefficient at the 5% confidence level not only for the complete period but also for at least one of 
the sub-periods. With regard to the domestic risk variables, the credit risk variable, except in the 
case of Ireland is positively significant in most of the countries at least for one or two sub-periods. 
It is also important to note that the negative coefficient that this variable presents in the case of 
France and Italy (the two biggest debt markets relative to the German one, see table 5) has been 
positive since 2003 in the case of France, and since 2001 in the case of Italy. These results imply 
that the “Too-big-to-fail” theory that we claimed in our earlier papers, where the sample finished in 
December 2001 (see Gómez-Puig 2008a and 2008b), may only be valid in the years immediately 
                                                 
12 The interaction term turns out to be significant in most of the cases, which supports the idea that it should be included in the estimations 
in order to avoid the omitted variables problem. 
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after the beginning of the Monetary Union. Therefore, with a longer time perspective, agents seem 
to believe in the “no-bail-out” clause imposed by the EMU, even in the case of large debt markets. 
With regard to the liquidity variables, the linear and the non-linear behaviour of both the on-the-
run/off-the-run spread and the bid-ask spread is supported by the results (at least in most of the 
countries and sub-periods studied). Tables 9 and 10 present the results for non-EMU countries. In 
particular, table 9 displays the results of the panel estimation for the four periods. The most 
important conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that non-EMU countries present a 
greater vulnerability to world risk factors than EMU-countries13. In particular, the coefficient of the 
international risk factor is always positively significant at the 5% confidence level except for the 
period 2001-2002. The fact that these countries do not share a common Monetary Policy might 
explain their greater vulnerability to external risk factors. The results shown in table 9 also 
corroborate the importance of domestic risk factors (both liquidity and credit risk) in yield spread 
behaviour. Moreover, the non-linear behaviour presented by liquidity proxies supports the self-
fulfilling nature of liquidity. Finally, table 10 presents the results for each of the three countries in 
this second group. Note that whilst panel regression supported the relevance of systemic risk in 
adjusted spread behaviour, the significance of the variable that captures this effect disappears in 
country-specific estimations. In these sets of estimations, it is domestic variables, and especially 
liquidity risk variables (both in their linear and non-linear form) that mostly drive adjusted spread 
behaviour.     
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have implemented a panel regression both for the whole period (1999-2005) and 
for the three sub-periods into which these seven years have been broken down, and an individual 
regression (with the same explanatory variables as in the panel regressions) for the nine and three 
countries in the two groups (EMU participants and EMU non-participants respectively).  Specific-
                                                 
13 Dewatcher et al. (2004) find that after Monetary Unification observed German bond yields are significantly lower than they would have 
been under Bundesbank policy and Allen and Song (2005) present some evidence that EMU has helped financial integration within the 
euro area. 
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country regressions are estimated for the same four periods as in the panel regressions. The results 
present clear evidence that it is domestic rather than international risk factors that mostly drive the 
evolution of 10-year yield spread differentials over Germany in all EMU countries during the seven 
years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. These results appear to be sound if we bear in 
mind that common factors (captured by world risk factors) will disappear when we take 
differentials between bond yields that present a very high correlation (0.99 on average). Therefore, 
even though bond returns present a high co-movement (systemic risk accounts for a large 
proportion of their behavior), a very substantial part of this movement cancels out if we study yield 
spreads, which mostly reflect idiosyncratic/local or domestic risk, i.e. specific factors in each 
different country. In the case of non-EMU countries, where 10-year government yields do not 
display such high co-movement (see figure 3), adjusted yield spreads (corrected from the foreign 
exchange factor) are influenced more by world risk factors. The fact that these countries do not 
share a common Monetary Policy might explain these results. In addition, outside the Monetary 
Union, these debt markets did not suffer the increase in their degree of substitutability and 
competition experienced by EMU-debt markets since January 1999. So this situation has benefited 
them (mainly in the first years after the beginning of Monetary Union), insofar as market 
participants consider their risk premium to be low and the investment advantages to be high. 
Finally, the results also support the relevance of domestic risk factors (especially market liquidity 
differences, which influence yield spreads both in a linear and in a non-linear way) in adjusted 
spread behavior in non-EMU participating countries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20 
References 
1. Adjaouté, K, L. Bottazi, J.P. Danthine, A. Fischer, R. Hamaui, R. Portes and M. Wickens 
(2000). “EMU and Portfolio Adjustment”. CEPR Policy Paper N°5. 
2. Allen, F. and W.L. Song (2005). “Financial Integration and EMU”. European Financial 
Management Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 7–24. 
3. Barassi, M. R., Caporale, G. M. and Hall, S. G. (2001). “Irreducibility and structural 
cointegrating relations: An application to the G-7 long-term interest rates”. International Journal 
of Finance and Economics n.6, pp.127–38. 
4. Bessler, D.A. and J. Yang (2003). “The structure of interdependence in international stock 
markets”. Journal of International Money and Finance n.23, pp.71-97. 
5. Bayoumi, T. M. Goldstein and G. Woglom (1995). “Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign 
Borrowers? Evidence from the US States”. Journal of Money Credit and Banking 27 (4) pp.1046-
1059. 
6. Barr, D.G. and R. Priestley. (2004). “Expected returns, risk and the integration of international 
bond markets”. Journal of International Money and Finance n. 23. 
7. Bekaert, G, and C.R. Harvey (1995). “Time-Varying World Market Integration”. Journal of 
Finance vol. 1, n.2. 
8. Bekaert, G, and C.R. Harvey (1997). “Emerging equity market volatility”. Journal of Finance, 50, 
403.  
9. Bekaert, G, C.R. Harvey and A. Ng (2005). “Market Integration and Contagion”. Journal of 
Business, vol. 78. n.1. 
10. Calvo, G.A. and C.M. Reinhart (1996). “Capital flows to Latin America: Is there evidence of 
contagion effects. In G. Calvo, M. Goldstein and E. Hochreiter (Eds). Private capital flows to 
emerging markets. Institute of International Economics (Washington). 
11. Christiansen, C. (2007). “Volatility Spillover Effects in European Bond Markets”. European 
Financial Management, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 923–948. 
12. Cifarelli, G. and G. Paladino (2006). “Volatility co-movements between emerging sovereign 
bonds: Is there segmentation between geographical areas? Global Finance Journal n. 16. 
 21 
13. Clare, A., Maras, M. and Thomas, S. (1995). “The integration and efficiency of international 
bond markets”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 22, 313–22. 
14. Cox, J.C.; J. Ingersoll and S.A. Ross (1985). “A theory of the term structure of interest rates”. 
Econometrica, n. 53 (2), pp.385-407. 
15. DeGennaro, R., R. Kunkel, R. and J, Lee (1994). “Modeling international long-term interest 
rates”. Financial Review n.29, pp. 577–97. 
16. Dewatcher, H., M. Lyrio and K. Maes (2004). “The Effect of Monetary Unification on German 
Bond Markets”. European Financial Management, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 487–509. 
17. Driessen, J., Melenberg, B. and Nijman, T. (2003). “Common Factors in International Bond 
Returns”. Journal of International Money and Finance 22(5), pp.629-656.  
18. Dumas, B. and B. Solnik (1995). “The world price of foreign exchange risk”. Journal of Finance n. 
50, pp.445-479. 
19. Economides, N. and A. Siow (1988). “The Division of Markets is Limited by the Extent of 
Liquidity (Spatial Competition with Externalities)”. American Economic Review, Vol.78, n°1 pp 
1719-1734. 
20. Favero, C., F. Giavazzi and L. Spaventa (1997). High Yields: The Spread on German Interest 
Rate. The Economic Journal, Vol.107, Issue 443. 
21. Favero, C. and F. Giavazzi (2002). “Is the International Propagation of Financial Shocks Non-
Linear? Evidence from the ERM”. Journal of International Economics, 57 (1), pp.231-246. 
22. Favero, C., M. Pagano and E.L. von Thadden. (2007). “How Does Liquidity Affect 
Government Bond Yields?”.  Forthcoming in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.  
23. Fleming, M.J., (2003). “Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity”. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Economic Policy Review 9, pp.83-108. 
24. Geyer, A., S. Kossmeier and S. Pichler (2004). “Measuring Systematic Risk in EMU 
Government Yield Spreads”. Review of Finance n. 8. 
25. Gómez-Puig, M., (2006). “Size Matters for Liquidity: Evidence from EMU sovereign yield 
spreads”. Economics Letters, Vol.9, Issue 2; pp.156-162, February. 
 22 
26. Gómez-Puig, M. (2008a). “Monetary Integration and the Cost of Borrowing”. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, Vol.27, Issue 3; pp. 455-479          
27. Gómez-Puig, M. (2008b) “The Immediate Effect of Monetary Union over EU-15’s Sovereign 
Debt Yield Spreads”, forthcoming in Applied Economics.  
28. Hunter, D.M. and D.P. Simon (2005). “A Conditional Assessment of the Relationships 
between the Major World Bond Markets”. European Financial Management Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 463-
482. 
29. Ilmanen, A. (1995). “Time-Varying Expected Returns in International Bond Markets”. The 
Journal of Finance vol. L. n.2. 
30. Masson, P. (1999). “Contagion: Monsoonal effects, spillovers and jumps between multiple 
equilibria”, in AGenor, P.R., M. Miller, D. Vines and D.Weber (eds), The Asian Financial Crisis: 
Causes, Contagion and Consequences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
31. Pagano, M. and E.L. von Thadden. (2004). “The European Bond Markets under EMU”. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, vol. 20, n.4. 
32. Pesaran, M.H. and A.Pick (2007). “Econometric issues in the analysis of contagion”. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics & Control n31, pp.1245-1277. 
33. Smith, K.L.(2002). “Government bond market seasonality, diversification, and cointegration: 
international evidence”. Journal of Financial Research, n. 25, pp.203-221. 
34. Tesar, L. and I. Werner, 1995. Home bias and high turnover. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, Vol.14, N°4, pp.467-492. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
Figure 1 
EMU Countries' 10 year yields
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Figure 2 
EMU Countries' 10-year spread over Germany
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Figure 3 
10-year Government's yields
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
/0
1
/1
9
9
9
0
1
/0
4
/1
9
9
9
0
1
/0
7
/1
9
9
9
0
1
/1
0
/1
9
9
9
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
0
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
0
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
0
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
0
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
1
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
2
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
3
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
4
0
1
/0
1
/2
0
0
5
0
1
/0
4
/2
0
0
5
0
1
/0
7
/2
0
0
5
0
1
/1
0
/2
0
0
5
Germany
Denmark
Sweden
United Kingdom
 
Source: Datastream 
 
Figure 4 
 
10-year yield spread over Germany
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Figure 5 
10-year swap spreads over Germany
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Figure 6 
10-year adjusted spreads over Germany
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Source: Datastream. 
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Table 1- Correlation coefficient: 10-year government yields in the EU-15 and US (1999-2005)  
 
US GE AT BE FI FR IE IT NL PT SP DK SW UK
US 1.000
GE 0.743 1.000
AT 0.757 0.996 1.000
BE 0.769 0.994 0.997 1.000
FI 0.768 0.993 0.994 0.997 1.000
FR 0.751 0.997 0.996 0.996 0.994 1.000
IE 0.754 0.992 0.994 0.995 0.994 0.993 1.000
IT 0.757 0.995 0.997 0.998 0.995 0.997 0.994 1.000
NL 0.754 0.998 0.996 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.995 0.997 1.000
PT 0.744 0.990 0.994 0.994 0.990 0.992 0.993 0.994 0.992 1.000
SP 0.766 0.993 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.995 0.994 0.997 0.996 0.993 1.000
DK 0.765 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.995 0.992 0.991 0.990 0.994 0.988 0.993 1.000
SW 0.622 0.955 0.943 0.940 0.948 0.948 0.946 0.937 0.954 0.943 0.942 0.957 1.000
UK 0.793 0.836 0.820 0.825 0.821 0.826 0.803 0.817 0.833 0.805 0.820 0.834 0.797 1.000  
 
NOTE: US: The United States, GE: Germany, AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, 
IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SP: Spain, DK: Denmark, SW: Sweden and UK: The United 
Kingdom. Source: Datastream 
 
 
Table 2- Correlation coefficient: EU-15 spreads/aspreads over 10-year Germany government 
yields and US risk factor (1999-2005)          
                    
US
US 1.000
AT -0.056
BE -0.136
FI -0.113
FR -0.026
IE -0.004
IT -0.017
NL -0.055
PT 0.107
SP -0.052
DK 0.088
SW 0.546
UK 0.556  
 
NOTE: US: The United States, AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: 
The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SP: Spain, DK: Denmark, SW: Sweden, UK: The United Kingdom. Source: 
Datastream 
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Table 3- 10-year yield spreads/aspreads over Germany (1999-2005) 
 
10 year yield spread/adjusted spread  over Germany
1P: 1999-2000 2P: 2001-2002 3P: 2003-2005 1999-2005
AT average 0.240 0.209 0.021 0.137
st.deviation 0.066 0.067 0.062 0.120
BE average 0.295 0.245 0.054 0.177
st.deviation 0.057 0.080 0.042 0.124
FI average 0.214 0.165 -0.027 0.097
st.deviation 0.037 0.091 0.066 0.128
FR average 0.136 0.122 0.033 0.088
st.deviation 0.062 0.051 0.042 0.070
IE average 0.156 0.128 -0.065 0.053
st.deviation 0.060 0.050 0.090 0.126
IT average 0.298 0.309 0.156 0.240
st.deviation 0.062 0.075 0.045 0.094
NL average 0.139 0.125 0.022 0.085
st.deviation 0.037 0.044 0.047 0.070
PT average 0.307 0.306 0.062 0.202
st.deviation 0.081 0.125 0.070 0.152
SP average 0.256 0.235 0.004 0.142
st.deviation 0.037 0.083 0.030 0.131
DK average 0.034 0.020 -0.029 0.003
st.deviation 0.093 0.043 0.067 0.076
SW average -0.254 -0.084 -0.186 -0.176
st.deviation 0.138 0.061 0.066 0.112
UK average -0.496 -0.213 -0.183 -0.281
st.deviation 0.146 0.080 0.064 0.168  
 
NOTE: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: 
Portugal, SP: Spain, DK: Denmark, SW: Sweden, UK: The United Kingdom.  Source: Datastream 
 
Table 4 
 
EMU (1999-2005)
(Ii-IDM) (IRSi-IRSDM) ASPREADi
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2)
DK Average 0.233 0.230 0.003
St.dev. 0.145 0.126 0.076
SW Average 0.301 0.478 -0.176
St.dev. 0.228 0.248 0.112
UK Average 0.414 0.694 -0.281
St.dev. 0.392 0.380 0.168  
 
NOTE: DK: Denmark, SW: Sweden, UK: The United Kingdom.  Source: Datastream 
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Table 5 
          OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF GOVERNMENT'S DEBT (billions of euros)
1999-12 2000-12 2001-12 2002-12 2003-12 2004-12 2005-12 average 99-05 average% of EMU average% of EU-15
Austria 75.35 81.03 83.40 83.25 78.41 77.60 80.1 79.9 2.19% 1.88%
Belgium 233.82 238.90 247.93 252.50 252.54 250.13 256.9 247.5 6.78% 5.84%
Finland 45.89 46.00 46.98 47.20 52.14 54.55 49.2 48.9 1.34% 1.15%
France 603.72 639.98 676.16 732.14 817.7 862.93 910.6 749.0 20.52% 17.67%
Germany 610.29 640.19 680.25 744.64 812.94 875.63 899.7 751.9 20.59% 17.74%
Greece 88.99 93.28 103.48 123.20 138.81 158.95 175.9 126.1 3.45% 2.97%
Ireland 24.89 23.21 20.20 22.69 28.33 31.35 31.7 26.1 0.71% 0.61%
Italy 1041.21 1042.67 1063.43 1060.65 1074.6 1097.50 1156.2 1076.6 29.49% 25.40%
Netherlands 180.87 176.36 179.73 188.23 203.41 214.82 227.35 195.8 5.36% 4.62%
Portugal 37.73 40.84 46.18 56.74 62.62 70.85 82.8 56.8 1.56% 1.34%
Spain 299.52 314.45 319.19 328.79 330.56 337.57 343.2 324.8 8.89% 7.66%
EMU 3242.29 3336.92 3466.92 3640.03 3852.06 4031.86 3988.0 3651.2 100.00% 86.14%
Denmark 92.08 88.88 88.28 93.07 83.65 84.58 77.2 86.8 - 2.05%
Sweden 123.83 113.06 92.36 99.27 112.54 117.25 109.8 109.7 - 2.59%
United Kingdom 459.88 458.36 466.58 452.01 466.31 602.58 680.41 512.30 - 12.09%
non-EMU 675.79 660.29 647.23 644.04 601.11 696.87 867.4 684.68 - 16.15%
EU-15 3918.08 3997.21 4114.15 4284.07 4453.17 4728.73 4175.1 4238.64 - 100.00%
United States 4380.35 4408.28 4765.57 4329.74 3984.84 4059.10 4806.0 4390.56 - -  
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements 
 
Table 6 
Issue Date Symbol Coupon Maturity Date
AUSTRIA 01/02/1998 RAGB 5% 15/01/2008
01/04/1999 RAGB 4% 15/07/2009
01/12/1999 RAGB 5.50% 15/01/2010
01/05/2001 RAGB 5.25% 04/01/2011
01/05/2002 RAGB 5% 15/07/2012
01/08/2003 RAGB 3.80% 20/10/2013
01/11/2004 RAGB 4.30% 15/07/2014
01/08/2005 RAGB 3.50% 25/10/2015
BELGIUM 01/01/1997 BGB 6.25% 28/03/2007
01/12/1997 BGB 5.75% 28/03/2008
01/02/1999 BGB 3.75% 28/03/2009
01/02/2000 BGB 5.75% 28/09/2010
01/05/2001 BGB 5% 28/09/2011
01/08/2002 BGB 5% 28/09/2012
01/07/2003 BGB 4.25% 28/09/2013
01/05/2004 BGB 4.25% 28/09/2014
01/05/2005 BGB 3.75% 28/09/2015
FINLAND 01/12/1998 RFGB 5% 25/04/2009
01/02/2000 RFGB 5.75% 23/02/2011
01/02/2001 RFGB 5.75% 23/02/2011
01/02/2003 RFGB 5.38% 04/07/2013
01/03/2005 RFGB 4.25% 04/07/2015  
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Table 6 (cont) 
Issue Date Symbol Coupon Maturity Date
FRANCE 01/01/1999 FRTR 4% 25/04/2009
01/07/1999 FRTR 4% 25/10/2009
01/03/2000 FRTR 5.50% 25/04/2010
01/09/2000 FRTR 5.50% 25/10/2010
01/06/2001 FRTR 6.50% 25/04/2011
01/01/2002 FRTR 5% 25/10/2011
01/05/2002 FRTR 5% 25/04/2012
01/10/2002 FRTR 4.75% 25/10/2012
01/04/2003 FRTR 4% 25/04/2013
01/01/2004 FRTR 4% 25/10/2013
01/05/2004 FRTR 4% 25/04/2014
01/12/2004 FRTR 4% 25/10/2014
01/05/2005 FRTR 3.50% 25/04/2015
01/09/2005 FRTR 3% 25/10/2015
01/03/2006 FRTR 3.25% 25/04/2016
GERMANY 01/08/1998 DBR 4 3/4% 04/07/2008
01/02/1999 DBR 3 3/4% 04/01/2009
01/04/1999 DBR 4% 04/07/2009
01/08/1999 DBR 4 1/2% 04/07/2009
01/11/1999 DBR 5 3/8% 04/01/2010
01/06/2000 DBR 5 1/4% 04/07/2010
01/12/2000 DBR 5 1/4% 04/01/2011
01/06/2001 DBR 5% 04/07/2011
01/02/2002 DBR 5% 04/01/2012
01/08/2002 DBR 5% 04/07/2012
01/02/2003 DBR 4.50% 04/01/2013
01/08/2003 DBR 3.75% 04/07/2013
01/01/2004 DBR 4.25% 04/01/2014
01/12/2004 DBR 3.75% 04/01/2015
01/06/2005 DBR 3.25% 04/07/2015
01/12/2005 DBR 3.50% 04/01/2016
IRELAND 01/10/1997 IRISH 6% 18/08/2008
01/07/1999 IRISH 4% 18/04/2010
01/05/2002 IRISH 5% 18/04/2013
01/05/2005 IRISH 4.60% 18/04/2016
ITALY 01/02/1998 BTPS 6% 01/11/2007
01/07/1998 BTPS 5% 01/05/2008
01/01/1999 BTPS 4.50% 01/05/2009
01/10/1999 BTPS 4.25% 01/11/2009
01/07/2000 BTPS 5.50% 01/11/2010
01/06/2001 BTPS 5.25% 01/08/2011
01/02/2002 BTPS 5% 01/02/2012
01/10/2002 BTPS 4.75% 01/02/2013
01/07/2003 BTPS 4.25% 01/08/2013
01/05/2004 BTPS 4.25% 01/08/2014
01/02/2005 BTPS 4.25% 01/02/2015
01/08/2005 BTPS 3.75% 01/08/2015
NETHERLAND 01/02/1998 NETHER 5.25% 15/07/2008
01/02/1999 NETHER 3.75% 15/07/2009
01/02/2000 NETHER 5.50% 15/07/2010
01/04/2001 NETHER 5% 15/07/2011
01/05/2002 NETHER 5% 15/07/2012
01/04/2003 NETHER 4.25% 15/07/2013
01/05/2004 NETHER 3.75% 15/07/2014
01/07/2005 NETHER 3.25% 15/07/2015  
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Table 6 (cont) 
Issue Date Symbol Coupon Maturity Date
PORTUGAL 01/06/1998 PGB 5.375% 23/06/2008
01/07/1999 PGB 3.95% 15/07/2009
01/06/2000 PGB 5.85% 20/05/2010
01/04/2001 PGB 5.15% 15/06/2011
01/05/2002 PGB 5% 15/06/2012
01/08/2003 PGB 5.45% 23/09/2013
01/05/2004 PGB 4.38% 16/06/2014
01/10/2005 PGB 3.35% 15/10/2015
SPAIN 01/11/1997 SPGB 6% 31/01/2008
01/01/1999 SPGB 5.15% 30/07/2009
01/01/2000 SPGB 4.00% 31/01/2010
01/02/2001 SPGB 5.40% 30/07/2011
01/10/2001 SPGB 5.35% 31/10/2011
01/07/2002 SPGB 5% 30/07/2012
01/08/2003 SPGB 4.80% 30/07/2013
01/07/2004 SPGB 4.75% 30/07/2014
01/01/2005 SPGB 4.40% 31/01/2015
DENMARK 01/07/1997 DGB 7% 15/11/2007
01/02/1999 DGB 6% 15/11/2009
01/03/2001 DGB 6% 15/11/2011
01/03/2003 DGB 5% 15/11/2013
01/03/2005 DGB 4% 15/11/2015
SWEDEN 01/07/1998 SGB 9% 20/04/2009
01/02/2001 SGB 5.25% 15/03/2011
01/08/2002 SGB 5.50% 08/10/2012
01/02/2004 SGB 6.75% 05/05/2014
01/05/2005 SGB 4.50% 12/08/2015
U.KINGDOM Oct-98 UKT 9% 13/10/2008
Apr-99 UKT 5.75% 07/12/2009
Apr-01 UKT 6.25% 25/11/2010
Aug-01 UKT 5% 07/03/2012
Sep-03 UKT 8.50% 27/09/2013
Dec-03 UKT 5% 07/09/2014
Mar-05 UKT 4.75% 07/09/2015  
Source: Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
Table 7 
 
Cross-Sectional Time-Serie FGLS Regression.
dependent variable: SPREAD
X it 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005
LNDEBTGDP it 0.043** 0.556** -0.159** -0.327**
(0.060) (0.019) (0.028) (0.012)
ONOFFDIF it 0.480** 0.407** -0.529** -0.510**
(0.024) (0.107) (0.054) (0.046)
ONOFFDIF2 it -1.553** - 2.827** -2.881**
(0.108) (0.385) (0.172)
BIDASKDIF it 0.529** 0.153** 0.191** 0.471**
(0.033) (0.053) (0.082) (0.061)
BIDASKDIF2 it 0.874** -1.057* 1.382* 1.775**
(0.362) (0.567) (0.743) (0.757)
USSPREAD it 0.008* - - -0.048**
(0.005) (0.008)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD it 0.007** 0.018** 0.010** 0.018**
(0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD it -0.500** - - -
(0.024)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD it 1.547** -4.065** -0.792** 2.381**
(0.094) (-3.826) (0.238) (0.148)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD it -0.303** - - -0.539**
(0.037) (0.063)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD it -0.997** - -1.687** -
(0.364) (0.604)
DAUSTRIA 0.056** 0.517** -0.182** 0.320**
(0.004) (0.018) (0.026) (0.008)
DBELGIUM 0.056** - - 0.678**
(0.009) (0.018)
DFINLAND 0.022** 0.458** -0.215** 0.226**
(0.004) (0.017) (0.029) (0.007)
DFRANCE - 0.305** -0.234** 0.510**
(0.015) (0.214) (0.012)
DITALY 0.123** 0.056** 0.065** 0.761**
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017)
DNETHERLANDS - 0.261** 0.240** 0.423**
(0.013) (0.024) (0.010)
DPORTUGAL 0.107** 0.630** -0.114** 0.466**
(0.004) (0.020) (0.028) (0.011)
DSPAIN 0.059** 0.352** -0.102** 0.388**
(0.005) (0.012) (0.020) (0.010)
CONSTANT 0.072** -0.478** 0.4451** -0.267**
(0.006) (0.024) (0.033) (0.017)
Number of observations = 14674 4253 4174 6254
Number of groups = 9 9 9 9
Avg obs per group = 1669 500 494 696
Log likelihood = 30311.21 9864.034 9683.918 14767.5
Wald chi2 = 102334.55 1741.75 31258.25 25701.7
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
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Table 8a 
 
 
Table 8b 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
dependent variable: SPREAD
                         FRANCE                                 IRELAND                            ITALY
X t 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005
LNDEBTGDP t -1.647** -4.854** - 0.865** - - - - -0.322** -1.000** 2.552** 0.863**
(0.566) (1.609) (0.157) (0.123) (0.336) (0.323) (0.147)
ONOFFDIF t -0.832** - -0.948** -0.993** 0.203** - - - -0.214** 1.360** -1.220** -0.890**
(0.040) (0.064) (0.012) (0.097) (0.102) (0.342) (0.220) (0.067)
ONOFFDIF2 t 1.149** - - - 1.414** - 3.644** 0.684* 3.166** - 3.450* -
(0.541) (0.357) (1.132) (0.403) (0.820) (1.757)
BIDASKDIF t - - -2.469** -0.217** 0.719** - 10.934* - 0.129* - - -0.308**
(0.936) (0.070) (0.273) (6.597) (0.071) (0.184)
BIDASKDIF2 t - -13.533** - -1.519** -9.077* - -145.522* - -4.065** -9.224** - -
(6.332) (0.623) (5.252) (74.633) (1.188) (1.992)
USSPREAD t - - - 0.312** - -0.380* - - 0.100** - 0.600** 0.524**
(0.046) (0.198) (0.051) (0.181) (0.101)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD t - - - 0.992** 0.332** -1.139** - - - - -0.553** -0.644**
(0.151) (0.146) (0.515) (0.180) (0.124)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD t -0.123** - - - -0.393** 1.653* - - 0.643** - 0.282* -0.110*
(0.033) (0.114) (0.940) (0.094) (0.148) (0.065)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD t -0.874** - - - -0.857** - -2.347** - -2.691** - - -
(0.435) (0.302) (0.838) (0.656)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD t - - 2.318** 0.221** -1.037** - - -1.085** -0.288** - - -
(0.773) (0.076) (0.443) (0.487) (0.073)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD t - - - - 13.466* - - - 5.034** 11.008** - -
(7.595) (1.412) (3.228)
CONSTANT 0.741** 1.990** - -0.222** - 0.335** - -0.852** - 1.495** -2.296** -0.530**
(0.212) (0.627) (0.048) (0.131) (0.390) (0.398) (0.330) (0.121)
Number of obs 1739 508 517 714 936 149 147 640 1756 517 522 717
F = 1013.24 21.79 339.24 3495.14 1358.62 135.88 211.60 580.03 1942.83 293.27 1227.55 1582.69
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
dependent variable: SPREAD
                               AUSTRIA                                     BELGIUM                                       FINLAND
X t 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005
LNDEBTGDP t - - - 0.292** 0.261* - 1.198** 0.413** 0.195** - - 0.414**
(0.098) (0.140) (0.451) (0.100) (0.090) (0.078)
ONOFFDIF t -0.728** 0.625** -0.662** -0.942** -0.435** - -1.236** -0.995** -0.576** - -0.748** -1.029**
(0.065) (0.316) (0.179) (0.030) (0.083) (0.223) (0.057) (0.128 (0.134) (0.090)
ONOFFDIF2 t 1.647** - - - 6.306** - - - 1.458** 4.052* - -
(0.292) (0.846) (0.472) (2.094)
BIDASKDIF t 0.272* -0.376* - 0.514** - - - 0.597** - - - -
(0.153) (0.223) (0.158) (0.119)
BIDASKDIF2 t -0.764** - - -1.427** - - 13.918** 3.549** - - - 6.674**
(0.418) (0.501) (5.358) (1.149) (3.160)
USSPREAD t - 0.200* -0.096** -0.034** -0.130** - 0.391* - - - -0.025** -0.089**
(0.116) (0.041) (0.010) (0.044) (0.223) (0.009) (0.018)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD t 0.288** -0.962* 1.009** -0.256** 0.143** - 0.344* - - - - -0.229**
(0.052) (0.577) (0.293) (0.083) (0.045) (0.209) (0.076)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD t - - - - -0.414** - 0.304* - - - -0.266** -
(0.086) (0.167) (0.105)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD t -1.018** - - -0.233** -4.490** - - - -0.753** - - -
(0.234) (0.117) (0.751) (0.335)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD t -0.330** 0.833** - -0.455** -0.275** - -0.652* -0.621** - - - -
(0.165) (0.419) (0.143) (0.120) (1.611) (0.126)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD t 0.969** - - 1.272** 2.806* - -9.122* - - - - -7.841**
(0.441) (0.469) (1.469) (4.814) (3.412)
CONSTANT 0.112** - - - - - -0.924* -0.387** 0.163** 0.188* - 0.087**
(0.018) (0.499) (0.089) (0.022) (0.099) (0.035)
Number of obs 1748 513 521 714 1755 516 522 717 1742 505 520 717
F = 2080.63 229.8 453.2 3726.1 2482.82 158.57 785.09 3898.08 2410.33 24.72 662.46 1194.5
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
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Table 8c 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
dependent variable: SPREAD
                      THE NETHERLANDS                             PORTUGAL                            SPAIN
X t 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005
LNDEBTGDP t 0.322* - - - 0.957** - - -0.450** - - - 0.193**
(0.179) (0.404) (0.183) (0.093)
ONOFFDIF t -0.485** - -0.844** -0.520** -0.815** -1.224* - -1.025** -0.327** - - -0.815**
(0.080) (0.195) (0.096) (0.086) (0.632) (0.069) (0.119) (0.064)
ONOFFDIF2 t 3.672** - - 1.576** 1.525** - -0.773* - 6.191** - - -1.239**
(0.753) (0.658) (0.429) (0.403) (1.468) (0.594)
BIDASKDIF t - - - - 0.298** - - - - - - 0.440**
(0.118) (0.095)
BIDASKDIF2 t - - - - - - - - - - - -2.832
(1.120)
USSPREAD t - - - -0.070* 0.221** -0.289** 0.317** -0.164** - - - -
(0.042) (0.045) (0.109) (0.086) (0.039)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD t - - - - -0.863** 2.472* -1.734** 0.725** 0.109** - - -
(0.206) (1.267) (0.696) (0.168) (0.048)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD t 0.323** - - -0.384** - 1.774** - 0.100** -0.438** - -0.688**
(0.072) (0.100) (0.855) (0.049) (0.125) (0.322)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD t -2.420** -11.240** - -1.444** -0.866** - - - -4.003** - - 1.400**
(0.595) (5.180) (0.614) (0.282) (1.261) (0.645)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD t - - - - -0.412** - - - - - - -0.514**
(0.145) (0.106)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD t - - - - - - - - - - - 3.549**
(1.127)
CONSTANT - - - - - 0.265** - 0.175** - - - -0.014**
(0.090) (0.044) (0.005)
Number of obs 1691 517 513 661 1402 511 522 717 1557 517 390 650
F = 616.11 8.45 302.59 413.25 3786.13 75.48 1455.87 4306.99 3635.23 65.53 925.85 374.91
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
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Cross-Sectional Time-Serie FGLS Regression.
dependent variable: ASPREAD
X it 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005
LNDEBTGDP it -0.554** 0.637** -0.597** -0.108**
(0.024) (0.248) (0.049) (0.035)
ONOFFDIF it 0.776** 3.631** - -
(0.044) (0.337)
ONOFFDIF2 it 3.662** -17.711** - 1.100**
(0.282) (2.734) (0.484)
BIDASKDIF it 0.300** -2.392** -0.889** 1.198**
(0.140) (0.414) (0.348) (0.161)
BIDASKDIF2 it - 34.105** -6.962** -4.503**
(6.208) (2.791) (1.444)
USSPREAD it 0.717** 0.758** -0.039** 0.034**
(0.010) (0.112) (0.014) (0.011)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD it 0.251** -2.192** 0.238** 0.127**
(0.016) (0.405) (0.020) (0.033)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD it -0.541** -4.782** 0.237** 0.453**
(0.043) (0.667) (0.065) (0.144)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD it -3.819** 19.747** - -
(0273) (5.473)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD it -0.691** 4.864** - -1.789**
(0.174) (0.777) (0.203)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD it - -64.322** 6.525** 11.563**
(10.581) (2.971) (1.828)
DSWEDEN -0.201** -0.283** -0.153** -0.182**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
DUNITED KINGDOM -0.368** - -0.380** -0.181**
(0.007) (0.018) (0.014)
CONSTANT 0.094** -0.222** 0.177** -
(0.011) (0.080) (0.020)
Number of observations = 4715 1030 1392 2293
Number of groups = 3 3 3 3
Avg obs per group = 1611 515 466 765
Log likelihood = 9518.28 1901.09 3303.71 5124.37
Wald chi2 = 20059.37 5962.64 9637.16 9348.36
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
 35 
Table 10 
 
 
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
dependent variable: ASPREAD
                               DENMARK                                     SWEDEN                                       UNITED KINGDOM
X t 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005 1999-2005 1999-2000 2001-1002 2003-2005
LNDEBTGDP t - -1.193** 1.362** - -0.872** -1.168** 1.090** -0.751** - - - -
(0.566) (0.436) (0.157) (0.353) (0.570) (0.201)
ONOFFDIF t - -1.179* 0.763** - 0.731** 1.657** -1.182** - - - - -0.790**
(0.697) (0.303) (0.316) (0.487) (0.380) (0.402)
ONOFFDIF2 t 1.450** 9.343** - - 5.428* - -18.133** - - - - -
(0.643) (4.476) (3.281) (5.289)
BIDASKDIF t 0.828** 3.432* - 0.927** - - - - - - -4.953** -
(0.344) (0.020) (0.328) (2.132)
BIDASKDIF2 t -15.815** -76.229** -196.309** - - 15.937** - - - - 79.569** -
6.182) (37.060) (99.346) (5.766) (35.310)
USSPREAD t - - - - - -0.498** - - - - - -
(0.186)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD t - - -1.023** - 0.478** 2.420** -1.035** 0.698** - - - -
(0.309) (0.141) (0.674) (0.357) (0.270)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD t - 3.182** -0.347* - -0.540* - 0.905** 2.181** - - - -
(0.988) (0.188) (0.300) (0.312) (0.952)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD t -1.433** -20.695** - -4.101** - - 15.428** 10.449* - - - -
(0.607) (7.289) (2.024) (4.988) (5.801)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD t -0.865** -1.915** - -1.198** - - - - - - 4.374** -
(0.422) (2.339) (0.451) (1.922)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD t 17.454** 68.083** - - - -30.827** - - - - -68.230** -12.434**
(9.925) (47.263) (9.752) (30.098) (6.051)
CONSTANT - 0.371** - - - - - - -0.141** - - -0.212**
(0.160) (0.030) (0.079)
Number of obs 1804 513 508 783 1686 517 442 727 1225 450 442 783
F = 222.24 108.44 55.48 148.21 134.82 114.47 54.13 83.23 79.96 196.6 57.23 88.39
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
